Sachs reiterates a point he’s made before: that the very poor are stuck in a “poverty trap” that leaves them unable to benefit from trade. If you can grow barely enough food to feed your family, you can’t invest in the tools, improved fertilisers and other materials needed to improve yields so you can sell some of your produce. Indeed, if your plough breaks, you can’t even replace it, so your productivity actually declines.

But it’s not just physical capital such as tools that the poor lack. Sachs outlines six major types of capital the poor are short in:

1. Human capital: health, nutrition and skills
2. Business capital: machinery, tools, transport
3. Infrastructure: roads, power, telecoms
4. Natural capital: fertile soil, running water
5. Public institutional capital: rule of law, property rights, policing
6. Knowledge capital: scientific know-how for future development.

This last includes top-level investment, like India’s Institutes of Technology, which have helped it become a hugely successful IT services exporter; it also means training individuals at village level as community health workers, agricultural experts and so on.There are no shortage of ways such capital can be reduced. Simple wear and tear, such as overfarming, can lead to a decline in natural capital, business capital, and infrastructure. Moreover, population growth means that the share of natural capital available to each individual is always decreasing.

For capital to increase, on the other hand, requires investment. Either individuals must be able to save to invest in their personal capital; or, by paying taxes, must help the government invest. If this investment is possible, the capital growth enables economic growth, raising incomes.

Sachs gives a simple example of how the level of capital a household has determines whether or not they can get on the ladder of development. Watch out: there are numbers.

[scarynumbers]

Say that an economy needs $3 of capital for every $1 of goods it produces. And say that natural depreciation reduces the society’s capital by 2% a year. The economy has 1 million people, each with capital of $900. $900 produces $300 of production, or income. That’s less than $1/day, which classifies them as extremely poor. $300 a year is just enough for subsistence and not enough to save. And the population is growing at 2% a year, so in ten years there’ll be 1.2 million people. Ten years on, the capital stock has declined to $750 million; between 1.2 million people we’re down from $900 each to $628 each - generating income of only $209 per person. Simply through the passing of time, the very poor get poorer still.

If, on the other hand, you start with everyone having $1800 of capital, and therefore $600 annual income per person. Households manage to save $90 per person each year. That adds $90 million to the total capital stock, which outweighs the depreciation of $36 million (2% of 900 million). The next year’s capital stock totals $1854 million, which means income (divide by three) of $618 million. Even divided between the expanded population of 1.2 million, that’s still an improvement - $606 each.

[/scarynumbers]

Start with a high enough capital level, and you allow the cycle of economic growth to take place. But once you did below that critical level, that’s a poverty trap - and the only way is down. (p247-249)

In fact, investment in capital usually benefits more than the example illustrates, because of returns on investment. For example, if you have a vital road like that which leads to the Kenyan port Mombasa, repairing damage to that road could hugely reduce the costs of production in several landlocked countries, benefits far greater than the actual investment put in. On the other hand, some investments have to reach a certain point before they have any effect at all - there’s no point paving half a road. This is called a threshold effect.

Still with me? Sachs’ point with all this is that investment in the lives of the poor can repay itself by plugging them into economic growth - and, in so doing, weaning them back off external investment and into self-sufficiency. In practice, poor countries lack the capital to make such investments, and donors must step in and take countries to this level through aid. “Targeted investments backed by donor aid,” says Sachs, “lie at the heart of breaking the poverty trap.” (p250)

Private versus public

Of course, capital isn’t really as simple as pouring in a pile of money. In a previous chapter Sachs compared development to medicine and proposed a complex system of diagnosis to decide which exact combination of investments will lift each country out of the poverty trap. Now Sachs points out that only some of the investments required are best performed by the government: infrastructure, human capital, natural capital, public institutions and some aspects of knowledge capital, especially scientific research aimed at improving the previous categories of capital. These aspects can be led by the public sector and funded largely by aid at first.

They’re best done by government - and this is one of Prof. Sachs’ more controversial observations - for several reasons:

• First, if done by the private sector they would probably become monopolies, raising prices.
• Second, some are “nonrival”, which means that one person’s use doesn’t reduce another’s ability to use. A road, for example, is a nonrival good - there isn’t a limited number of cars that can use a road in a day. A scientific discovery is another example. Because it’s not easy to make money off these, investment has to come from the public sector (even in America, Sachs notes, there’s significant public finance of science).
• Third, they have “spillovers” from direct users to those around them. If you use an anti-malaria bed net, it also reduces my chance of infection by slowing the spread of the disease. Private enterprise tends to under-provide such goods, for example by charging more for bed-nets than people can afford.
• Fourth, these types of capital are not only good for economic growth but are classified as human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the clause “Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family”. They’re good results in and of themselves, so-called ‘merit goods.’ For certainty these should be provided by the public sector.

Other areas of capital - business capital - should not be provided by governments. This is where Sachs outlines that, contrary to the occasional accusation, he isn’t a communist. Government-run businesses, Sachs argues, tend to be inefficient and run for political reasons which get in the way of effective operation. For example, factories get built in a minister’s constituency, not where they can be best run. Having said that, the government might temporarily support private business to get things moving, but withdraw when businesses become self-sufficient. An example of this is providing farmers with free or subsidised fertiliser for a few years.

“Differential diagnosis”

Working out the precise checklist of interventions needed in each place is difficult. Urban areas have different needs to rural areas; climate, mineral and agricultural wealth, all make a difference. What’s clear nevertheless, Sachs argues, is that investments must come together. There’s no single ‘magic bullet’ which alone will make the difference, although economists like to think there is - for example, right now it’s public institutional capital, with constant talk about ‘governance’. Reducing child mortality, for example, obviously requires improved human capital and infrastructure through health spending. But it also needs natural capital, for protection against drought; public institutional capital, for the management and effective use of investment; and knowledge capital, for scientific research into future improvements in health and nutrition. Each country, and at a more local level each area, needs a targeted package of investments matched to its specific needs.

It can work, Sachs says

Sachs offers ten examples of scaling-up programs that have proved successful. I’ll quickly describe two:

• The ‘Green Revolution’ in Asia is Sachs’ primary example of how improved agricultural results can transform an entire economy, kick-starting economic growth. Investment by the Rockefeller Foundation, a once-mighty American money-pot, led to new high-yield types of staple crops in Mexico and then across Asia. For the first time, there was enough food to go round, thanks to rich-country scientific support.
• The spread of contraception in the poor world has been “an example of scaling up par excellence“. The UN Population Fund was established in 1969 to co-ordinate the spread of planned parenthood techniques, and helped raise the use of contraceptives by couples in developing countries from 10% in 1970 to 60% in 2000. This has helped bring about a reduction in the average children born to every woman from 5 in 1950 to 2.8 now. And as we’ve seen before, that has knock-on effects for child mortality, as families have no more children than they can feed.

Technologies that have been proven to work at local level can, and should, be expanded to national level and beyond, argues Sachs. But in Africa, proven technologies like anti-malaria bed nets remain available to tiny proportions of the population. The heart of Sachs’ plan is a process for scaling-up those technologies across poor countries. Next time, we’ll see how Sachs says this will work.

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The report of the Commission for Africa, summarised here and more heavily here, is an ambitious and sophisticated analysis of the problems plaguing Africa and the steps needed to solve them. But it isn’t without critics. Last time, I looked at those who criticised the Commission for being too conservative in its calls for Western action and in its criticisms of the role of rich countries and corporations in Africa. This time, let’s look at the other side: those who criticise the report for going too far in those same directions. You could call this the “right-wing” criticism, because its central point is that the Commission doesn’t put enough faith in markets. This is the view of a large number mainstream economists.

This is trickier because, for some reason that I’m not sure of, these criticisms tend not to be about the Commission specifically, but more generally about the whole Live8 / Make Poverty History poverty imbroglio (or, to give it its proper name, the Global Call To Action Against Poverty. Take this article in business newspaper, um, The Business. It encapsulates most of the key pro-market criticisms of the Commission. But it actually reserves its criticisms mostly for Live8 and the Make Poverty History campaign (indeed, the article actually praises the Commission for some of its comments about trade barriers). So I’ll introduce these ideas here, but only briefly. Once we’ve finished laying out The Main Proposals, we’ll be looking at the criticisms in more detail.

There are three main problems, this view argues, with the Africa Commission’s proposals and others like them:

1. Insufficient faith in markets. To left-wing critics, the Africa Commission’s report promotes “a model of development ‘favourable to deregulated free markets and Western economic and political interests.’” To more right-wing critics, however, the opposite is the case. While they welcome the commission’s calls for reductions in trade barriers within Africa, and on the part of rich countries, they call for a host of more radical pro-business reforms, such as abolishing communal land tenure arrangements.
2. Excessive faith in African governments. The Africa recognises corruption and poor governance as obstacles to development, but is broadly optimistic about the prospects for tackling them, with support and training from rich countries. It puts significant faith in NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism, and expresses confidence that a new generation of African leaders is more committed to democracy and transparency than its predecessors. To these critics, however, most African states remain profoundly corrupt, incompetent, and an obstacle to growth. Success lies in reducing their power through privatisation of industries and services.

The history of Africa since the 1960s is the history of groups of elites seeking the political kingdom with the primary purpose of enriching themselves, Mbeki says. To rectify this situation, he believes that Africas poorest people must be empowered through the institutions of the free society: property rights and markets.

These two criticisms combine to dispute one of the key demands of the Commission: that rich-country “conditions” on aid, loans and debt relief should be extensively reduced, giving governments more power to control their own economies; and similarly, that free-trade negotiations in organisations like the World Trade Organisation grant African governments the special right to protect their economies with subsidies and trade barriers.

3. Excessive faith in aid. Aid is really the biggest bone of contention for the pro-market critics. They see it as a failure, and as representing an over-reliance on non-market solutions to poverty. Here’s The Business again:

Wearing a white wristband and calling for hand-outs or debt relief is not the answer, says a growing band of young and educated Africans. The money will merely be frittered away, diverted into the Swiss bank accounts of a corrupt ruling class and do little or nothing to bring about prosperity, they say… Poverty in Africa cannot be reduced through government-to-government financial transfers, which never trickle down. This kind of aid perpetuates poverty, promoting poor government policies and corruption, rather than real and lasting economic growth.

Notice how, in the post above, debt relief is seen as pretty much another form of “handout”. This is because, by freeing up resources for governments, the free-market critics believe debt relief fuels corruption and gets salted away just like aid. Indeed, because aid can be given direct to NGOs working on the ground, some even argue debt relief is worse.

I’m not even going to begin delving into this one now, as it will be explored in detail soon. The debate over aid tends to become the flashpoint between the economics mainstream and campaigners. If you want to get ahead on the case against aid, the man to read is William Easterley, a former World Bank economist who’s led the assault on aid in the media. A decent place to start is this record of an event for the launch of his latest book, with downloadable audio of his presentation. For an opposing view, this post in the excellent blog Our Word Is Our Weapon, which tends to support aid, disputes some of the points made in the Business article. Also, have a look at my del.icio.us bookmarks about aid, arguments for it, criticisms of it, and discussions about it.

Before we leave the Africa Commission Report alone (sob!), there’s a little more to be said on a theme I introduced last time, of criticisms of the Commissioners themselves. This, again, is primarily a habit of those accusing the Commission of being too free-market, or to put it another way, “a web of bankers, industrialists and political leaders… all committed to spreading the gospel of free market capitalism.” But it isn’t just the business backgrounds of the Commissioners that has attracted criticism. Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian Prime Minister who was probably the Commission’s most high-profile member, was once touted as one of the new generation of democratic leaders who would help turn around Africa’s fortunes. But following a disputed election in 2005, Zenawi allowed police to arrest hundreds of protestors, and shoot some, prompting widespread international criticism. Zenawi’s recent intervention in the civil war in Somalia has also proven controversial.

Right, that’s it on the Commission for now. But most of its proposals, and the criticisms of it, will be discussed again when we put together our summary of the main proposals for ending Africa’s poverty troubles. First, back to unfinished business: Jeffrey Sachs.

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Criticisms of the Commission break down into two categories, which can be oversimplified as: suggestions that the Commission is too generous to Africa, and suggestions that it is not generous enough. You could call one set of criticisms essentially “left-wing” and one “right-wing,” but that would be more of an oversimplification still. What would be fairer is to say that one set of criticisms come primarily from more radical campaign groups, particularly smaller grassroots groups; and the other comes primarily from mainstream and conservative economists.

The nub of the first viewpoint is that the Commission is not radical enough in its goals or its proposals. Specifically, there’s a widespread complaint that the Commission should have spoken out more against the free-market policies that African governments have adopted in the last twenty years, largely at the behest of Western donors and the IMF and World Bank. This article by a Ghanaian journalist is a fine example, as is this article by Britain’s George Monbiot. Here’s the Ghanaian, Yao Graham:

True, some of the commission’s proposals are welcome: an extra $25bn year into the continent by 2010 (and a further $25bn by 2015); full debt cancellation for the poorest countries; and the end of rich country export subsidies in cotton, sugar and agriculture. But predictably, there’s a rather large catch. To qualify, Africa is asked to embrace what is called ‘good governance’, an innocent-sounding term hiding a free market agenda that puts the freedom of firms before the strengthening of citizenship and the rights of people.

As examples of the Commission’s “free market agenda”, Graham points out the lack of complaint in the report about environmental devastation and human rights abuses in the Niger Delta, or the privatisation of vital services like water. Both of these are examples of actions taken by private companies, often with the support of aid donor governments, which many African and foreign NGOs are opposed to. Monbiot develops the theme, though he’s not just talking about the Commission specifically.

I think Graham’s statement that the “good governance” talked about in the Commission’s report is primarily about free market access is simply inaccurate. The focus of the report’s discussions of governance is on corruption. But the wider comment, that the Report offers no serious restriction on the role of foreign private companies in Africa, is accurate. And it’s certainly true that both the Commission and the general tone of the mainstream debate about Africa tends to assume that, as Monbiot puts it, “Multinational corporations… are not the cause of Africa’s problems, but the solution”. But it’s not fair to suggest the Africa Commission is actively pushing free markets on African leaders. In fact, it specifically speaks out against policy conditions on aid and loans, the main way in which free-market policies have been pushed on African countries in the past.

A wider question that this opens up, though, is whether all this free marketing is actually a bad idea, as Graham and Monbiot state it is. It’s not something I want to get into now, but we’ll look at it more in future. There are certainly some horrible things in the recent history of Africa attributable to multinational companies, and some happening now. But it’s also hard to see a development path for Africa that doesn’t involve foreign investment.

If you want to think about it some more right now, this report includes several examples of this school of criticism.

Interstingly, this viewpoint tends to extend into criticism of the Commissioners themselves.It’s said that the Commission’s selection has a political bias, consisting mostly of those with an established commitment to free-market solutions to Africa’s problems: that, as this article puts it, they were “selected according to their ‘modernising’ credentials rather than their expertise.” This article introduces the Commissioners, calling them “A web of bankers, industrialists and political leaders with connections to the IMF and the World Bank, all committed to spreading the gospel of free market capitalism.”

It is, of course, unlikely that Blair would ever have put anyone on the Commission (and he did select it himself, or at least, his office did) who was going to severely criticise policies that the UK has been committed to for years. But to criticise the Commissioners for “links to the World Bank” seems a bit rich, given that it is, for all the criticisms of it, the world’s leading development institution. And to criticise Benjamin Mkapa, and Meles Zenawi, the leaders of Tanzania and Ethiopia, for steering their countries “directly into the arms of the IMF and World Bank” also seems slightly unreasonable: there is hardly any real aternative for a country dependent on aid and loans from those institutions for survival. My favourite is the criticism of activist Anna Tibaijuka, who “combines an active role in Tanzanian civil society forums with directorships in private companies dedicated to encouraging entrepreneurship and efficiency in the marketing of agricultural commodities.” Entrepeneurship and efficiency! Are they really saying these are the enemy?

I suppose what I’m saying is that the nine Africans on the Commission seem, to me, to be reasonably representative of mainstream educated African thought. The views the critics would have liked to see represented are perfectly valid, but they are quite radical, and, I think, rare amongst elected African leaders right now. But I don’t know this for certain.

That is a brief summary of the, for want of a better term, “left-wing” criticisms of the Africa Commission. I hope I haven’t been too biased in my description. The core issue - the place of free trade in Africa’s future - is something I’ll look at properly soon. Next, we’ll look at the other side of the coin - the “right-wing” critique.

UPDATE 05/06/07: Another left-wing critique.

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The 21st Century, Sachs noted, started well for poor countries. The Millennium Assembly, in September 2000, was the largest gathering of world leaders in history. It produced the Millennium Development Goals, the framework that has shaped aid efforts ever since. You’ll probably have heard of the goals, but it’s worth quickly summarising them. All are to be achieved by 2015 and start (for some reason) from 1990 measurements.

• Halve the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day, and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
• Ensure that all children can complete primary school
• Eliminate gender inequalities in education
• Reduce child mortality by two-thirds
• Reduce deaths in childbirth by three-quarters
• Have halted and begun to reverse the spread of AIDS, malaria and other major diseases
• Halve the proportion of people without access to clean water
• Integrate principles of environmental sustainability into country policies
• Improve the conditions of at least 100 million slum dwellers (this is by 2020)

There’s also a selection of vaguer, less measurable goals, including: develop a fair and open trading system that includes a commitment to poverty reduction; address the special trade needs of developing countries; address the special needs of small island states and landlocked states; put developing country debt on a sustainable footing; provide access to essential drugs in developing countries; and - my favourite for vagueness - “develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.”

The MDGs have been criticised, a view I might look at later on, mostly for being psuedo-scientific and unmeasurable. Plus, as Sachs points out, the world had made grand pronunciations on poverty before and then done nothing. Nevertheless, he says, “there was a palpable sense that this time [the promises] might be fulfilled.” The goals were an improvement on previous plans, noting the multidimensional nature of poverty, the importance of gender, and other lessons (it’s this comprehensiveness that gives them their slightly shopping-list feel). The world was enjoying a long economic boom. The signs were positive.

Then two planes hit the World Trade Center.

The attacks, Sachs argued, only strengthened the case for global action on poverty. “Terrorism hasw complex and varying causes, and cannot be fought by military means alone,” he argues. “To fight terrorism, we will need to fight poverty and deprivation as well… if societies like Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan were healthier, terrorists could not operate so readily in their midst.”

And for a while, it looked like this message might have got through. An international development conference in March 2002 reiterated the importance of aid and called on countries to meet the longstanding goal of devoting 0.7% of their economies to aid. The US announced the Millennium Challenge Account, a $10 billion aid program. It only nudged the US towards the 0.7% goal (from 0.14% to 0.2%, roughly), but it was a start.

Sachs labels the Iraq war as the sign that the Bush administration had lost interest in fighting extreme poverty. He does acknowledge that in January 2003, Bush further increased aid, specifically to combat AIDS - an extra $3 billion a year for five years. But overall, he argues, it was clear its focus on the military response to terrorism (supposedly) was draining energy from a nonmilitary response. “Official Washington,” he argues, “was completely focused on war rather than on development, the environment, and other issues of pressing human concern around the globe.” And, of course, the war has eaten money that might have been challenged into further aid increases. Incredibly, the war in Iraq has cost about an average of $5 billion every single month since it began in 2003. One month’s Iraq war = nearly two years of US AIDS spending.

Meanwhile, Sachs took up the two posts which now occupy him: Chair of the UN Millennium Project, and Director of Columbia University’s Earth Institute. The MDP was set up by Kofi Annan to bring rigorous analytical analysis to measuring progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, and to finding new ways of speeding that progress. Its report is something we’ll look at in more detail later. The Earth Institute had a similar goal, but with more of an environmental layer in addition to the poverty focus. Both based in New York, they’ve worked closely together. Sachs indulges in a brief advertisement for the Earth Institute which, though self-serving, is worth summarising as it gives good examples of the kinds of new study which he believes are providing solutions to the problems of poverty. The Institute is doing everything from using GPS data to predict malaria epidemics, to designing low-cost, long-life batteries to power lightbulbs in villages without electricity. The key aspect - which seems central to Sachs’ philosophy - is interdisciplinarity. Science, economics and politics have all looked at the problems of development separately. Sachs believes passionately they must work together to see the interconnected problems. It’s part of the “clinical economics” approach he outlined earlier in the book.

Sachs’ portrayal of his career has been accused of arrogance, and he does have the tendency to portray himself as the key actor in all the major achievements in development in recent years. But then, he’s so well-connected and apparently wise, I suppose it’s possible he really is as influential as he suggests. Either way, this cathchup to 2004, when Sachs wrote the book, concludes the autobiographical section. The remaining nine chapters outline in detail Sachs’ plan for ending poverty by 2025. This, essentially, is where the good stuff starts. See you then.

All quotations and statistics drawn from The End of Poverty, UK Paperback edition, pp. 210-226
.

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The China section is more of an academic discussion than a memoir, because, unlike Russia, India and the rest, China’s government has never asked Sachs for advice. It hasn’t needed to. Since 1978, China’s economy has grown at an average of 8% per year - adjusted for its growing population - making it, as Sachs puts it, “the world’s most successful economy” (p155).

The average Chinese person’s income has increased eightfold since 1978. Sachs’ primary concern is to ask: why did it take so long for Chinese growth to take off, why has it been so fast, and what lessons can we learn for other countries?

To answer the first question, Sachs paints a picture of a China cut off for centuries from trade with the world around it. Historian’s estimates suggest average income in China in the first few hundred years of the last millennium was on a par with that of Europe. But in 1434, the emperor dismantled China’s trade fleet and cut it off from international trade. As Europe colonised the New World and flourished, China’s growth stagnated. The isolation wasn’t broken till 1839, and then by force: the British attacked China to force it to open up to British opium imports (yes, you heard right: we attacked them to force them into buying our smack). European powers then controlled the beginning of China’s industrialisation, later joined by Japanese investors. But the benefits flowed outwards. Political turmoil worsened the situation and, instead of growing, China’s economy actually shrank.

Then in 1949 out of the turmoil rose the Communist regime that - in name at least - still governs today. The next few decades saw further economic stagnation, worsened by the two great disasters of the rule of Mao Zedong, the Great Leap Forward (a botched scheme of forced mass industrialisation that caused mass starvation) and the Cultural Revolution (a period of political purges and suppression of the arts and learning that cost over a million lives and helped further damage the economy). Only Mao’s death in 1976 heralded the beginning of change.

But Sachs is careful to pay due to one great achievement of the Mao era: a revolution in public health. Campaigns to eliminate widespread diseases like malaria and smallpox were accompanied by the development of a network of “barefoot doctors”, basically-trained community health workers for rural areas. Along with improved irrigation and agriculture, these changes meant massive improvements in child mortality and life expectancy. Of all Mao’s legacies, this - a healthier, stronger workforce - counted for most once China began economic reforms in 1978.

Reforms began with the simple freedom to buy and sell agricultural goods, and developed to include Special Economic Zones, liberalised areas designed to attract foreign investment. China’s tremendous growth began almost immediately. Over 500 years after the emperor dismantled the fleet, China was again engaging with the world on its own terms. Sach’s message is clear: only trade can pull countries out of poverty - and it must be controlled by the countries themselves, not primarily by foreign governments or businesses.
But China’s reforms have been more successful and less painful than Russia’s. Why? The traditional view, Sachs argues, states that China’s gradual approach is preferable to Russia’s “shock therapy” approach of rapid reform; and that China’s one-party state is more suited to successful reform than democracy. Both sides of this view, Sachs argues, are wrong. Russia’s rapid reform only came after years of gradualism failed to improve the economy, and China’s supposed gradualism had moved very rapidly in some areas, such as agricultural reform. In fact, Sachs argues, “China’s meteoric rise is more the result of China’s very different geography, geopolitics and demography than a different set of policy choices.” (p147)

• China in 1978 was far more agricultural than Russia. Liberalising agriculture is far easier than liberalising state-run industry: you simply let farmers organise themselves. In fact, decollectivisation was led from below, by farmers themselves, prompting a huge increase in productivity - and freeing up thousands of people to work in new private enterprises. By contrast, Russia was the employer and wage-payer of thousands of industrial workers, and liberalising the sector involved the risks and challenges of mass unemployment. In fact, China didn’t privatise its state industries until the 1990s, and unemployment rose there too.
• This also meant that China could move into industrialisation almost from scratch in ways which were compatible with western technology, easing import and export. Russia, on the other hand, had incompatible industrial infrastructure that had to be abandoned.
• China’s growth benefited from its thousands of miles of coast, spurring exports, unlike Russia (which, OK, has a coast, but which leads to the Arctic).
• Unlike China, Russia was saddled with massive foreign debt.
• Russia was suffering declining oil production, China was not.

Let’s think a little about the implications of this for Africa. Africa now is a lot like China in 1980: its jobs are 80% agricultural. Theoretically, therefore, there is scope for a China-style growth spurt and rapid, organic industrialisation. But think about one of those other points: the long coastline. Many of Africa’s poorest countries are landlocked, and even in those countries with coasts, transport costs are prohibitively high. African countries, like Russia in the early 1990’s, are saddled with unpayable debt. And while China had a healthy agricultural population after those years of public-health improvements, Africa’s is malnourished and struggling with Malaria, Tuberculosis, and AIDS.

What’s more, Sachs notes, China faces its own severe challenges still. One is to spread growth more geographically: the Tibetan plateau in the West is growing far more slowly than the coastal East. Migration from Western China to Eastern, Sachs observes, is currently humanity’s biggest single migration flow. There’s a North-South divide too, primarily owing to water shortages in the North. These problems are reminiscent of problems both in individual countries in Africa such as Ethiopia, where some areas enjoy relative plenty while others starve; and of Africa as a whole. Also, China has dismantled that worldbeating public health system, with SARS, Avian Flu and a growing AIDS problem all the result. Third, China has to deal with the environmental devastation industrialisation is bringing. And fourth, China’s undemocratic and highly centralised state will almost certainly have to change for growth not to be stifled (though how it changes, and whether democracy results, is not yet clear). Nevertheless, Sachs believes, “China is likely to be the first of the great poverty-stricken countries of the twentieth century to end poverty in the twenty-first century.”*
Next stop, India.

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• Chair of Columbia University’s Earth Institute and of the UN Millennium Development Project, he was also the adopted economist and a key frontman of the Make Poverty History campaign, and the most visible non-celebrity advocate for increased aid and debt relief.
• The End of Poverty, along with the Africa Commission Report and the Make Poverty History manifesto, is one of the clearest detailed statements of the “2005 concensus” calling for more aid, debt relief, and fair trade rules.
• His basic thesis is that, with investment and support from rich countries and good governance and policies from poor countries, extreme poverty (living on less than $1/day) can be eradicated by 2025.

Sach’s vision of development

• The world currently breaks down into XX categories of development:
  • 1 billion rich people (e.g. me and, probably, you);
  • 2.5bn middle-income people, (e.g. Indian IT workers;
  • 1.5bn poor people, e.g. Bangladeshi garment workers; and
  • 1bn extremely poor people, e.g. Malawian villagers.
• Prior to the industrial revolution of around 200 years ago, pretty much everyone - except tiny noble elites - was extremely poor: scraping buy on subsistence agriculture. It’s technological innovation since then that has generated the tremendous wealth in rich countries.
• Poverty in poor countries stems from the rates of growth in Europe and America not being mirrored elsewhere. All countries have grown, but some faster than others, and over 200 years this compounds into vast differences in wealth.
• Some of the factors that have allowed rich countries to grow faster include:
  • Political stability and openness
  • Education systems to breed innovation
  • Access to, and dominance of, the seas
  • Access to the markets of North America
• In addition, industrialisation reached many parts of the world only through colonialism, which meant a form of development with minimal long-term benefits, which was severely damaged when colonialism ended.
• Development is not a “zero-sum” game, with a certain amount of wealth to be shared out. Rich countries don’t have to get that way off the back of keeping poor countries poor; it’s possible for everyone to develop further, as the driver of growth -technological innovation - is unlimited.

Why some countries grow slower than others

• Wealth is increased through four main mechanisms:
  • Saving and investment: for example, a farming family buys a cow, and sells milk as well as grain
  • Trade: instead of just growing to eat, the family sells some crops to a neighbour and buys others, increasing the range of their diet and making a profit
  • Technology: a simple new variety of tougher seed could mean more income
  • Resource increase: a good summer or change in the local environment increases income.
• So when countries fail to grow, it’s often because these mechanisms are being blocked. If you can’t grow any spare crops to sell, you can’t trade, and you’re more susceptible if the crops fail. Technology not only needs investment to improve, but just to be maintained (machetes break and need repair). Most problematic of all, population growth will naturally reduce the amount of land available to fulfil the needs of each person. So a certain degree of growth is needed just to keep incomes even.
• At a country level, several factors amount to obstacles of this sort for many poor countries:
  • Geography: landlocked countries have less access to sea trade; countries in areas prone to malaria have a higher disease burden
  • Fiscal trouble: i.e. skint governments who can’t invest to spur trade and growth. This can happen even if there is money around, for example if the government’s tax income all goes on paying debts.
  • Governance trouble: certain basic requirements for trade, like good property laws, can be absent when government is weak (or operates arbitrarily).
  • Cultural barriers: like traditions that prevent women from working
  • Geopolitical barriers: like trade barriers adopted by other countries, e.g. sanctions.
  • Lack of innovation: without developed education sectors poor countries must often make do with technology designed for rich countries.
• Extreme poverty can create a “poverty trap” which makes it impossible to begin growth. For example, a country that cannot invest in education, research or infrastructure has little hope of developing. Therefore an international framework that is favourable to trade isn’t enough on its own to ensure growth.

Clinical economics

• Economics, like bodies, are complex, and repairing them takes care and dedicated study
• While working on one area, say trade, you must maintain other areas, like public services, at a steady level or the entire economy is at risk
• There are many possible causes of problems, and often more than one will occur at once. Instead of having “flavour of the month” problems which are deemed to be the obstacle for all poor countries, economists should carry out a detailed assessment of each individual economy, including aspects like geography, demographics and culture.
• Doctors constantly review their diagnoses and update them if the facts change. Economists tend to think they’re right and whatever results don’t fit are blamed on the country in question. Like doctors, they need to be more flexible and prepared to revise diagnoses.
• Doctors have a well-known and serious ethical code. Economists have been flippant and arrogant in their handling of poor countries’ economies. It takes serious and long-term commitment.

That’s the bare bones of Sachsism. Next, the good doctor takes us on an autobiographical journey through the many economies he’s fiddled with and the lessons he learned. Quick summary of that, coming up next.

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We’ve previously run through the Report, and each heading below will take you to the relevant post. Aren’t I just too nice?

So here’s a very quick run-down of the headline points:

Governance

• Good government is vital to economic growth
• African governments are getting more stable, democratic and transparent, but more progress is needed
• Judges, politicians, and journalists all need training to work to higher standards
• Corruption remains a huge obstacle to growth
• Rich countries must help by cracking down on money laundering and bribes by their companies
• African governments must publish details of how money is raised and spent

Conflict

• Conflicts large and small kill tens of thousands of Africans each year and severely retard economic growth
• Action to prevent and end conflict could cost rich countries far less than emergency aid once conflicts begin
• An international Arms Trade Treaty is needed to help control the flow of small arms to areas in conflict
• Valuable mineral industries must take action to prevent the sale of “conflict resources,” in the vein of the Kimberley Process
• The African Union can monitor and help prevent conflicts, but it needs support
• Careful peacebuilding policies after ceasefires can help prevent conflict recurring

Economic growth: internal changes

• Economic growth is the only long-term route to development and poverty reduction
• But internal barriers prevent an internal market developing, while poor governance and a bad image put off foreign investors
• Agriculture must be the driver of growth
• Rich countries should support the African Union’s Investment Climate Facility
• Massive investment is needed in transport infrastructure and irrigation
• Customs delays and internal tarrifs must come down
• Improvements in land and property laws will decrease agricultural povery and spur business
• Farmers need support to make small investments to diversify from fragile crops

Economic growth: rich countries’ responsibilities

• Agricultural subsidies by rich countries depress prices and should be scrapped
• Import tarrifs (taxes) in rich countries should also be phased out, especially for agricultural goods
• Other potential trade barriers, such as pesticide safety standards, should be designed not to block African countries from markets
• “Trade preference” schemes are vital for African countries to gain additional access to rich country markets. They should be extended, and unfair exceptions abolished
• Poor economies need protection. In multilateral trade discussions, rich countries should open their markets to poor countries without concessions from poor countries in return

Public services

• Economic growth will only end poor if those excluded from it are brought in
• This includes women, children and those so poor they can’t get on the “economic ladder”. Aid targeted at these groups, particularly women, will be the most effective at reducing poverty
• Education is vital but funding promises are not being kept. An extra $7-8 billion per year is needed to fund teacher training and abolish primary school fees
• Clinical health across Africa is on the point of collapse. $10 billion a year extra is needed right now to training doctors and nurses, abolish fees, and provide key, cheap equipment like malaria bed-nets
• To encourage research, rich countries should commit now to buy certain key medicines, like “liquid condom” anti-HIV gel, once they’re developed
• Existing commitments to funding clean water need to be met
• An extra $10 billion a year is needed to fight HIV and AIDS, with health workers getting smarter about African culture and beliefs, for example working with witch doctors.

Aid & debt relief

• The total cost of the Commission’s proposals is $75 billion a year
• Of this $25 billion should come from African governments, $50 billion from rich countries
• Half of this - of both rich countries’ and Africa’s share - should be made available now, the rest by 2010 if efforts are proving successful
• For rich countries, this amounts to an immediate doubling of aid to Africa
• To be effective, aid must be long-term, in grant, not loan, form, well-coordinated between donors, and usually given straight to governments. Extensive conditions on aid should be abolished
• Poor countries with good governance should recieve immediate 100% debt relief

The wider changes needed

• To be successful, development must be led by African governments and institutions, with foreign NGOs in a supporting role
• The government of the IMF, World Bank and WTO must be reformed to give Africa a greater voice
• African representation on the UN Security Council should also be improved
• A monitoring organisation should be set up to ensure the recommendations are fulfilled

I’ll be looking soon at some of the criticisms of the Africa Commission Report, and I’ll add those here too when I’m done.

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1. Development must be African-led. “History has shown that development does not work if it is driven from outside,” the report argues. “Regardless of how well intentioned outside donors may be, they will never fully understand what Africa requires… Africans must lead, and the rich world must give support.” In practice, this means aid should generally be given straight to African governments to use in line with their own priorities. Project support direct to NGOs should only be a last resort, where there is no coherent development strategy from Government and no transparency to ensure the money is used properly. African regional organisations, like the African Union and NEPAD, should also be supported.

2. Change in the major international institutions. The Commission doesn’t share the desire of some activists for these IMF and World Bank to be abolished - indeed, it calls for the World Bank to devote more resources and staff to Africa. But they do seek significant changes in the way they work. The Commission calls for the World Bank to follow the recommendations already laid out for aid: grants, not loans, longer-term assistance, better co-ordination between donors. For the IMF’s part, it needs more flexibility in the enforcement of its budget rules (more on this vexed issue later). Moreover, the Report demands “that Africa is given greater say in decision-making in these multilateral bodies. Africa should be given a stronger voice on the executive boards of the World Bank and IMF” (p47). The question of IMF and World Bank governance is large and complex; suffice to say the Commission takes a moderate approach, calling for a temporary extra two places for African governments on the main governing boards¹. Moreover, they call to transfer the main management of the two institutions from the current large, bureaucratic committees to smaller councils. And, they argue, the custom of the EU and US choosing presidents of the IMF and World Bank should end. The Commission also calls for increased African representation on the UN Security Council, and for membership of the World Trade Organization to be made easier for poor countries, in order to help them influence negotiations.
3. A monitoring institution to check on progress. Not just on aid given, but on its effectiveness and the improvements in a range of other areas. The commission suggests an independent body headed by two high-profile figures, an African and a non-African (which is more or less what happened).

The chapter also includes a stirring restatement of the need for continued political commitment to development by both African and rich-country governments, and a recap of the key arguments for taking urgent action. I won’t summarise this, but it’s worth a read - you can find it on page 66 of Part 1 of the report.

And that’s it! We’ve summarised the Report of the Commission for Africa. Next, I’ll prepare a quick bullet-point Summary of the Summary, and we’ll look at some of the criticisms of the report.

1. More radical proposals typically start with abolishing the current system of dividing up votes according to the funds countries put in to the institutions, leaving them effectively run by rich countries. The Commission stops short of calling for this.

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And what a lot of poor there are. Rather than revisiting the usual parade of misery-statistics, the Commission now waves one key one: that one in six people in Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 100 million people, are “chronically poor” (p61). Now, just to be clear, “chronically poor” is worse than “extremely poor,” the often-used $1/day standard. “Chronically poor” amounts to day-to-day subsistence, totally dependent on casual labour and with no serious chance of advancement, no resources to invest in routes to a better standard of living.

For the chronically poor, the only hope is some sort of external assistance. But, the Commission argue, many of them are excluded from such assistance by discrimination, on the grounds of sex, age, ethnicity, disability, or the stigma of AIDS. Given that more than 50% of the population is either female, young or both (p62), this isn’t just a minority issue, either.

Women & children first

It’s a jolt thinking of African poverty, which we’re used to thinking of as a sort of universal tragedy, in terms of such Western concerns as gender discrimination. But the evidence the Commission puts forward is pretty compelling. Women, they point out, contribute more economically than men - accounting, for example, for over 70% of agricultural production. And yet, when widowed, large proportions of women lose some or all of their assets to their in-laws: cattle, equipment, and rights to land are all improperly protected for widows by law. Given the death toll of young men across the country from AIDS and war, that’s a lot of mothers being left unable to feed their children - while land goes to augment other male relative’s land.

Improving the treatment of women will naturally improve the lot of children. Women not only tend to work harder, they are more likely to spend their earnings on household investments as opposed to men, who tend to spend it on “themselves” (it’s easy, but no doubt unfair, to take this as a euphemism for “booze and whores”). So discrimination against women needs to be tackled; indeed, there’s a strong economic case for “positive discrimination,” as in aid targeted straight at women and children. Small monthly payments direct to elderly carers, for example, improve children’s nutrition and school attendance, and cost less than food aid (p70). Instead of cash, free school meals, skills training and the like can be just as effective. Older people, too, make up a disproportionate share of the poor, and need special assistance.

Education, education, education

To really change children’s lives, however, the only long-term answer is education. Here, the Commission notes, the world doesn’t need convincing of the need. A pledge made in 2000, that became one of the Millennium Development Goals, commits the world to providing free primary education for every child in the world by 2015. Additional commitments were made to double adult literacy and abolish gender inequality in education by 2005. But while the commitment is there, the Commission notes, the will isn’t. The 2005 targets were missed, and the 2015 targets are looking shaky. An extra $7-8 billion a year is needed to properly fund education and see primary school fees abolished.¹ Free schooling has been, like everything else, the topic of much disagreement, with some Western economists arguing against it. But if the government can afford it - or if donors fund it - the evidence that it increases enrolment is hard to ignore. In particular, the Commission argues, abolishing school fees increases girls’ attendance most, as do measures like free school meals, because families forced to make choices will usually choose boys to be schooled. And yet, education boosts girls’ future wages substantially, lowers their fertility to more manageable levels, and reduces the likelihood of HIV infection (p65).

Apart from that, the money is needed to train more teachers to meet increased demand. Furthermore, curricula (a? ums?) need to be revised, with more vocational skills, and life skills teaching on things like avoiding HIV infection.

Clinical health

In 2001, when new Labour was in the final push towards its first re-election victory, it had a slogan: “schools and hospitals first.” Ever since, “health and education” have gone together somehow in politics, as the twin pillars of a healthy society that invests in its future. Perhaps I shouldn’t be surprised, given that the Commission’s chair is one Anthony Blair, to see that the report has the same priorities: once it’s done with education, health is next.

Healthcare in Africa, the Commission notes, is “at the point of collapse” (p66). Average spending per person is less than 1% the developed-world average. However, there is hope: many African countries have increased their health spending in the last few years. But as always, more money is needed, and the Commission takes the split approach it has in other areas, calling for $10bn a year until 2010, then if that’s proven effective, $20bn a year by 2015.¹ Three areas in particular need investment:

• Just as assistance is needed in training teachers, so with doctors and nurses: an extra one million are needed over ten years, with better salaries to stop flight to rich countries (i.e., Britain).
• Similarly like education, fees are a huge obstacle to use of health services, and investment is needed to abolish them for primary (GP-level) healthcare. Such a move more than doubled clinic attendance in Uganda, and it’s relatively cheap (p68).
• Preventable diseases are a huge part of the disease burden: 2/3 of infant mortality in the continent could be prevented with vitamins and bed-nets.² Providing the education and materials to prevent infection - including, of course, condoms - should be a top priority.

When it comes to less preventable diseases, donors should legally commit to buy remedies for the worst African diseases, should they be developed - for example a microbicide gel, worn by women and invisible to men, to prevent HIV infection.³ At present, pharmaceutical companies focus research almost entirely on western conditions such as heart disease, unsure if governments will be able to buy any new medicines developed for African health problems.

In addition, to make sure the money is as effective as possible, more work is needed to get donors working together effectively. Short-term, uncertain funding, with different donors pursuing different priorities, can waste large sums of money. A long-term, co-ordinated approach is needed, with donors contributing according to an arranged plan.

Public health

Of course, the doctor’s surgery and hospital mark the end, not the beginning, of the health journey (or something). Health starts with nutrition, good housing, and especially sanitation. This one is particularly crucial because it’s something governments have to be involved in providing - simply getting better off won’t get you clean water if your village has no pipe.

300 million Africans still don’t have safe water. Remember those stately Ethiopian women carrying water on their heads, an emblem of the famine of 1984-5? Well, even now, women and girls across Africa walk an average of six km to get water each today. And it’s not just exhausting, it’s unsafe; clean water reduces malaria prevalence, makes HIV treatment more effective, and allows HIV-positive mothers to use powder milk to prevent transmission to their children. And yet - in one of those really depressing statistics - aid to irrigation and sanitation projects had, by early 2005, dropped by 25% since 1996. Commitments are in place, they need to be honoured.

AIDS

The Commission lets loose with a barrage of statistics about the AIDS pandemic so unpleasant it’s hard to even feel jadedly blasé about it. 25 million Africans dead from the disease so far; another 25 million infected.

What’s worse, the report notes, AIDS affects many more people than just those infected. Maybe 90% of HIV+ people in Africa are aged 15-49, most likely to be working and supporting family members; the economic consequences for a country of 40% of its workforce succumbing to disease are hard to imagine. Saving, investment and education are all lower in HIV-affected households, with further consequences for general development.⁴ And thanks to a mixture of biological and social factors, the disease attacks women most. The result is a growing population of AIDS orphans.

Until recently, the report notes, donors hadn’t focussed on HIV/AIDS, but that’s starting to change (this good news story brings us up to date). Still, more needs to be done, not just in providing medicines but in tackling cultural and social factors. Health workers need to pay more attention to African traditions and beliefs about sex, gender, and death, and may need to make alliances with traditional leaders and healers to get their message across.

To fund both medicines and training, an extra $10bn a year is needed; and like in other areas, donors need to collaborate more effectively and commit more long-term to see the money have maximum effect.

Making growth work

Almost half the money the Commission calls for in total, an eventual $75bn a year, is for health and education. Investment in these areas, it’s suggested, is essential if growth is to benefit everyone in society. But to ensure the money isn’t wasted, monitoring processes are needed, and local communities need a say in how it’s spent.

The Commission’s proposals on health and education aren’t revolutionary, and they perhaps don’t express clearly enough how investments in these areas relate to, and work with, economic growth. But it’s a comprehensive bird’s eye view of the main challenges, and its emphasis on women and children is striking. Indeed, in many ways it’s interesting how similar the policies needed in Africa are to those we have in Europe - aid to mothers with children, free healthcare and education, and so on. Of course, the fact that these policies are similar to ours should make it harder for us to welch on the money. But it’s by no means clear if that’s the case. So, having laid out its multi-billion-dollar shopping list, the Commission turns next to the question on everybody’s lips: “Where will the money come from?”

1. The thought’s just occurred to me that the multiple spending requests included in this document don’t seem to have an end-date. The intention is to achieve the MDG’s, so naturally they focus on up till 2015. But after? I’ll look to see if it’s addressed directly anywhere.
2. There’s a whole massive thing about bed-nets. We’ll get into it more later on. Suffice to say, some people don’t think giving them away is a good idea, but most people do.
3. This, in fairness, is now in development, but slowly.
4. I hated it when, sometime around 2000, politicians and journalists suddenly started talking about the economic impact of AIDS. “Millions are dying,” they’d intone, “but also growth is set to be seriously impaired.” “Who gives a hell about growth?” I’d think. “You had me on ‘millions are dying.’” But, I can see now the point. Because this long-term affect on growth is what makes AIDS serious for all the people who aren’t infected; it’s why it’s a problem for the whole of Africa.

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Drop agricultural subsidies.

Western agricultural subsidies are the whipping boy of the Africa debate - it’s hard to find anyone, from the left, right or middle of the political spectrum, who will really stick up for them.¹ So it’s not a massive shock to see the Report join the chorus, calling rich countries’ trade barriers (including subsidies) “politically antiquated, economically illiterate, environmentally destructive, and ethically indefensible” (p89). Rich countries spend 16 times as much on subsidising their farmers as on aid to Africa. Such subsidies artificially lower prices, pushing poor-country producers out of business. For example, US cotton farmers are paid twice the world price for cotton, and the resulting overproduction drives the price down, threatening the livelihoods of farmers in West Africa. The Commission calls for a commitment to ending all export subsidies and trade-distorting support - that excludes things like research funding - by 2010, with cotton and sugar subsidies immediately scrapped.²

Drop other barriers

Subsidies lower the prices African farmers can obtain for their exports; import tariffs (taxes) slash the potential benefits of exports even more by hitting African imports when they come into rich countries. Just as rich countries subsidise agriculture more than industry, they protect agriculture more with tariffs as well, with agricultural tariffs three to four times higher than manufacturing ones, punishing Africa in the sector which over 80% of its farmers rely on for their livelihoods. “It is essential,” the Commission notes, “that rich countries stop discriminating against the few goods in which Africa has a comparative advantage” (p95). It calls for a reduction of all tariffs (not just agriculture) to zero by 2015. They also call for more care to be paid to development issues when considering things like health and safety standards: for example, the EU’s standards on banana pesticides are stricter than international standards, blocking $410 million of African banana exports.³

The Commission notes that Africa’s share of world trade has actually dropped in recent decades, from around six per cent in 1980 to two per cent in 2002.

Extend and improve preference schemes

For all the barriers placed between African exports and Western markets, there are some cracks in the edifice, in the form of “preferences” - direct country-to-country agreements to improve access in particular goods. Prior to the wave of multilateral trade talks that began in the 1980’s, these agreements were the main way in which tariffs were reduced. The preferences that exist give African countries important market access in key areas, but they need to be extended to poor African states currently excluded, like Ghana and Kenya. Moreover, they need to be simplified - current regimes are overcomplicated and overstrict, the Commission claims. For example, rules that specify a product has to be made in the country exporting it, have in some cases been extended to rule out, for example, fish caught by a boat from one country if the boat’s captain is from another country. The US is actually ahead of this, requiring on agricultural arrangements only that the country in question manufacture the goods, not worrying about the source of the fabrics. The Commission calls for this pattern to be adopted by other rich countries, and extended to other manufacturing. Such changes could ultimately increase African growth by 1%.

One-way concessions in trade talks

Ultimately though, the Commission recognises that multilateral agreements, not preference schemes, are the long-term solution to Africa’s trade problems. The report calls for a strong deal in the Doha round of World Trade Organisation negotiations by the end of 2006. What’s more, it asks that the steps outlined above be taken by rich countries without reciprocal concessions by poor countries. As the Commission notes, “this is not a level playing field,” and Africa needs to be allowed to lower its trade barriers at a slower pace.

This ultimately became a huge sticking point at the WTO negotiations, in Hong Kong in December 2005 and in Geneva in July 2006. While there was widespread agreement that rich countries should cut their tariffs and subsidies, particularly on agriculture, there were strong demands from rich countries that it make reciprocal concessions. Ultimately, this derailed the talks completely, and the Doha round is now widely considered over. It’s been said that the US was to blame, but the US denies being inflexible.

I’ll go into detail about the trade issue later on. It’s probably the most complex and bitter, with aid agencies disagreeing even about the importance of the Doha round’s collapse, some calling it “a disaster” and some “the best outcome for the world’s poor.” The Commission’s demand for African countries to be required to make no immediate concessions is comparatively strident, though, putting it in dispute with both the EU and US’ official positions.

Overall, the Commission’s proposals for ensuring growth are broad and quite comprehensive. But a central criticism of recent development thinking is that, while it’s adept at promoting growth, it forgets about making sure growth benefits the poor. So the Commission also devotes considerable time discussing how to spread the benefits of growth to those traditionally excluded from them - how, in their words, to “leave no-one out.”

1. OK, not everyone. And those who do agree they’re part of the problem are dragging their heels on scrapping them; this was one of the key disagreements behind the collapse of the Doha round of trade negotiations. More on that later. Nevertheless, cutting subsidies has the crucial advantage of appealing to both sides of politics: left-wingers like it because they think it will benefit poor countries, and right-wingers like it because they see subsidies as wasteful and distorting of free markets.
2. The Commission called for these moves to be made at the December 2005 meeting of the WTO in Hong Kong. Nothing of the sort happened, and the Doha round of WTO negotiations all but collapsed in Geneva in July 2006. But major reductions in subsidies remain a goal of the negotiations, should they ever be completed.
3. Seriously, how do they measure these things?

*No puns till I get some donations. I warned you!

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